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Douglas Tyler fo:lllone count of Aggravated Arson, a first degree
felony, in violaJaffln of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 103, Utah Code
Annotated (1953T^illl amended).

The appellant was found guilty by a

jury on November ill, 1990, in the Third Judicial District Court in
and for Salt LaJfiB Bounty, State of Utah, the Honorable Timothy R.
Hanson, Judge, MHMiding.

The final judgment and conviction were

rendered on Januaj|f|| K 1991, whereby Mr. Tyler was sentenced to an
indeterminate. tHNHIlof 5 years to life at the Utah State Prison.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

AMENDED
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)
901901330 FS
Case No. .
TIMOTHY R. HANSON
Count No.
EVELYN THOMPSON
Honorable
BUNNY NHUZHSCHWAJTDER
Clerk
JACK
WEISS
Reporter _
FEBRUARY
8. 1991
Bailiff

Plaintiff,

vs.
J.V^CT ^QTTfrr.Aq TVT.r*

mcp>

Date

Defendant.

, to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
• The motion of.
impose sentence accordingly is • granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted b y ^ f a jury; D the court; " plea of guilty;
D plea of no contest; of the offense of
A^reiyT.ynm J^.SPN
, a felony
of the _2
degree, D a class
misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and
represented h y S t McCATJGHEY and the State being represented by v , VHpnTrr < j s now adjudged guilty
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison:
D
D
D
j¥ jB
D
D
*V 33

. years and which may be for life;
to a maximum mandatory term of.
not to exceed five years;
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years;
of not less than five years and which may be for life;
not to exceed
years;
and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $.
, to
BE ^ETE^MIN-FD .
and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $.

a such sentence is to run concurrently with
D such sentence is to run consecutively with
are hereby dismissed.
a upon motion of O State, D Defense, D Court, Count(s)
D
• Defendant is granted a stay of the above (D prison) sentence and placed on probation in the
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult
Parole for the period of
, pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
D Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County£3 for delivery to the Utah State
Prison, Draper, Utah, or • for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment.
>b 13 Commitment shall issue
FORTHWITH.
/
DATED this

. day of

rjjjgr

»19 ? i

• ' , / • /

COPIES TO COUITSEL

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
TIMOTHY R. EA2TS0N

Defense Counsel

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondant,
vs.
Case No. 910118
JAMES DOUGLAS TYLER,
Priority No. 2
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a final judgment and conviction against James
Douglas Tyler for one count of Aggravated Arson, a first degree
felony, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 103, Utah Code
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The appellant was found guilty by a

jury on November 29, 1990, in the Third Judicial District Court in
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Timothy R.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondant,
vs.
Case No. 910118
JAMES DOUGLAS TYLER,
Priority No. 2
Defendant/Appellant.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Section
78-2-2(3 )(i), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), whereby the
defendant in a criminal action may take an appeal to the Supreme
Court from a final judgment of the District Court involving a
conviction of a first degree felony.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Were counsel for appellant ineffective in representing

him to the extent that it was tantamount to actual and constructive
denial of counsel?

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The texts of those statutes and constitutional provisions that
do not appear in the body of the brief are included in Appendix A.
1

STANDARD OF REVIEW
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim is usually a mixed
question of law and fact. See State v. Templin, 805 P 2d 182 (Utah
1990), (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct.
2052,

80

L.

Ed.

2d

674

(1984).

Questions

of

law can be

independently reviewed. (See Templin at 187). Questions of fact
will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous (see id.)
The Strickland standard of review applies, wherein appellant
must show that counsel' s performance was deficient and that the
deficiency prejudiced the appellant (See Templin at 186).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction against James
Douglas Tyler for one count of aggravated arson, a first degree
felony, in violation of §76-6-103 Utah Code Annotated (1953 as
amended).

A jury found Mr. Tyler guilty as charged in the

information on November 29, 1990, in the Third Judicial District
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Timothy R Hanson, Judge, presiding.

The final judgment and

conviction were rendered on January 7, 1991 whereby Mr. Tyler was
sentenced to an indeterminate term of 5 years to life at the Utah
State Prison.
Appellant's trial counsel withdrew after filing the notice of
appeal in this case, citing a conflict of interest based on
appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

New

counsel was appointed to prepare and submit appellant's appeal.
2

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 1, 1990, police officers were called by Ms. Kathy
Tyler to 525 East 800 South in Salt Lake City.

The police spoke

with Ms. Tyler, a resident of the house located there, whom they
located next door at her neighborsfs house. They also detained Mr.
Tyler, the appellant, who was located nearby. (See Nov. 28 R. p.
94)

Ms. Tyler entered her home after talking to the police.

Shortly thereafter, there was a fire discovered burning in the
kitchen area.

The police called the fire department.

Appellant

was brought from an area in the rear of the house to the front.
Some keys and Ms. Tyler's identification card were taken from him
(R.102) and then he was arrested.

The fire burned for about 5

minutes from the time it was discovered until the fire department
put it out (R.109).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Counsel for appellant was ineffective in their representation
of appellant to the extent that appellant's entire defense was
compromised.

His constitution right to effective assistance of

counsel was denied him and subsequently he did not receive a fair
trial.
Appellant charges that not only was trial counsel ineffective,
so too were the lawyers he had prior to the appointment of trial
counsel.

The attorney who conducted the preliminary hearing on

August 16, 1990 had not spoken to appellant prior to that hearing.
3

The attorney originally assigned to the case spoke once with
appellant on July 12, 1990. By the time trial counsel got the case
the scene of the crime was cold and altered, and crucial evidence
was no longer available.

No one had investigated the case for

appellant at all until October 15, 1990.

Trial counsel could not

adequately contest the States1 evidence nor present sufficient
evidence of his own to corroborate appellant's account of the
facts. No one interviewed witnesses in a timely manner, no experts
were summoned to dispute the State's experts. Appellant was denied
the opportunity to present a coherent, substantial defense.

POINT I
Counsel were ineffective in their representation of appellant
in violation of his constitution guarantee to effective
representation.
Their ineffectiveness amounted to actual and
constructive denial of counsel.
INTRODUCTION
The information against appellant was filed on July 5, 1990.
Appellant was appointed counsel shortly thereafter. Nancy Bergeson
(hereinafter Bergeson) Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, was
assigned the case.

She made an appearance and a request for

Discovery on July 9, 1990 (See Appendix B: Appearance of Counsel
and Motion for Discovery).

The County Attorney responded to that

motion on July 16, 1990. (See Appendix B: Response to Discovery).
Bergeson met with appellant once on July 12, 1990.

Ms. Bergeson

apparently went on vacation from sometime after July 12 until early
August

1990.

Bergeson requested
4

that John Wennergren, MSW,

interview appellant in the jail, and he prepared a memorandum for
Bergeson on July 27, 1990.

(See Appendix B: Memorandum) Bergeson

filed a motion to withdraw based on an office conflict of interest
with appellant on August 3, 1990 (See Appendix B: Motion to
Withdraw).
Appellant's preliminary hearing scheduled for August 2, 1990,
was postponed because appellant had no attorney.
hearing

was

finally

held

on

August

16,

The preliminary

1990.

Ken

Brown

(hereinafter Brown) had been appointed to the case and he appeared
on August 16.
hearing.

Appellant had never spoken to Brown prior to that

The hearing culminated in a bindover to district court.

Appellant's district court arraignment set for September 10,
1990 was continued because appellant had no attorney.

Brown had

moved to withdraw because appellant had complained to the Utah
State Bar

about Brown.

September 17, 1990.

Appellant was

finally

arraigned

on

Stephen McCaughey (hereinafter McCaughey)

appeared as counsel for appellant.

Appellant had never met nor

spoken to McCaughey prior to September 17. (See Sept 17 R. p. 3)
Appellant was asked to enter a plea and he responded that he'd
like to talk to a lawyer (Id p.4).

The judge did not appreciate

appellant's responses, but it was established that McCaughey would
meet with appellant and discuss his case the next day.

McCaughey

met with appellant 2 days later, 79 days after the fire.
No one investigated anything for appellant until October 15,
31, 1990, when McCaughey had some investigation done.
At

appellants pre-trial

conference
5

on October

1, 1990,

McCaughey stated he was awaiting transcripts of the preliminary
hearing and that he had been "planning to get down to talk with"
appellant (See Oct. 1 R. p.3-4.)
On October 17, 1990, McCaughey moved to continue the trial
scheduled for October 18, because he and his investigator needed to
" . . . check on some problem . . . with the fire investigation .
. ." (now four months old).

McCaughey did not know if the "scene

" was still intact (see id).

In fact, the "scene" had been

repaired (See Nov. 29 R. P. 5)

Appellant had been in jail 109

days.

Trial was set for November 28, 1990.

ARGUMENT
While ordinarily a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
must be addressed by collateral attack through habeas corpus
proceedings, in limited circumstances the claim may be raised on
direct appeal.

State v. Johnson 176 Utah. Adv. R. 17. [Utah. C.

App January 31, 1991 citing State v. Humphries, 818 P2d 1027, 1029
(Utah 1991)].

Those circumstances exist when there is new counsel

on appeal and there is an adequate trial record. (See Johnson, at
18).

That is the case here.

This court may proceed to consider

the merits of appellants claim.
Although there are no fact findings as to the ineffectiveness
of counsel here, the records of what actually transpired allows
this court to determine on appeal, as a matter of law, whether
counself s performance constituted ineffective counsel (See Johnson
at 18, citing Government of Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 748 F 2d at
6

133-134. )
In Hollawav v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 479 (1977) the U.S.
Supreme Court said that the right to effective assistance of
counsel is "so basic to a fair trial that [its] infraction can
never be treated as harmless error." (cited in Johnson at 18)
The

Sixth

Amendment

to

the

United

States

Constitution

guarantees an accused the right to effective assistance of counsel.
In deciding ineffective assistance claims based on the federal
constitution, this Court has relied on Strickland v. Washington 466
U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed 2d 674 (USSC 1984) Strickland
set out a two-part test:
First, the appellant must show that counsel's performance was
deficient, meaning that errors were made so serious that counsel
was not functioning as "counsel" guaranteed the appellant by the
Sixth Amendment.
Second, the appellant must show that the deficient performance
prejudiced him, meaning counsel's errors were so serious as to
deprive appellant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is
reliable. 466 U.S. at 687 (See also State v. Templin 805 P2d at
186, Utah 1990).
This Sixth Amendment right has been interpreted to mean
"reasonable, effective assistance" (See id). Appellant carries the
burden of meeting both parts of the test. (See id). Appellant must
identify the "acts or omissions" which, under the circumstances,
show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness.

Appellant must show there is a reasonable
7

probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the rest
of the proceedings would have been different.
probability

A reasonable

is one sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome [See id 466 U.S. at 694; 805 p 2d at 187).
This court should consider the totality of the evidence,
whether the errors affect the entire evidentiary picture or have an
isolated effect, and how strongly the verdict is supported by the
record (See id 466 US at 696;805 P 2d at 187)
However, in Sixth Amendment claims based on actual denial of
counsel, constructive denial of counsel or conflicts of interest,
prejudice is presumed (emphasis added). Se id 466 U.S. at 692; 805
P 2d 186 footnote 204).
The Strickland court said:
"Counsel can deprive a defendant of the right to effective
assistance simply by failing to render adequate legal assistance."
466 U.S. at 692
Appellant contends that all the lawyers he had rendered such
perfunctory assistance as to amount to actual denial of counsel in
the case of Bergeson, and constructive denial in the case of Brown
and McCaughey.

Thus the prejudice prong of the Strickland test

should be presumed here.

Bergeson did nothing for the appellant

while more than a month passed and the "scene" cooled.

Then Brown

appeared and conducted the preliminary hearing without the benefit
of any preparation, investigation or contact with appellant.

If

the Circuit Court forced Brown to conduct the hearing that day,
then the Court was a party to the constructive denial of counsel.
Appellant insists those facts alone speak against reasonable,
8

effective assistance and representation•
McCaughey appeared on September 17 and met with appellant 2
days later.

As of October 1, McCaughey had no other contact with

appellant. He initiated an investigation on October 15, long after
the "scene" had been repaired.

His efforts were too little, too

late, ineffective, and amounted to constructive denial of counsel.
Appellant contends Bergeson was ineffective for not arranging
to have the "scene" investigated. She was not "functioning" as the
counsel" guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.

It was actual denial

of counsel during perhaps the most crucial time for discovery and
consultation.

The importance of immediate investigation in an

arson case is obvious. The burn pattern, the point of origin, the
presence or lack of accellerants, the possibility of other sources
or causes of the fire, should be investigated by the defense at the
scene, before it is cleaned up or repaired. Surely the state would
be calling their arson investigator and "expert" to state his
findings and opinions. No such investigation was conducted by the
defense lawyers here.
events were still fresh.

No one interviewed witnesses while the
No timely investigation was made of Ms.

Tyler, the key witness.
At trial there was contradictory testimony regarding whether
Ms. Tyler had called the police to report a fire or a disturbance
or both (Nov. 28R p. 99; 157-158; 185). There were tapes made of
the calls to the police dispatcher that would have clarified that
issue but the tape was erased before McCaughey subpoenaed it (Nov.
29R p. 7) Since the State's own witness, Tennison, remembered Ms.
9

Tyler calling the police twice, once to report a fire, that tape
became crucial to impeach Ms. Tyler and the police, corroborate
appellant's testimony and support his theory that she may have
started the fire and blamed him. The fire was small.
fire department 2 minutes to put it out.
total.

It took the

It burned for 5 minutes

Ms. Tyler had a fire at her home two months prior and

blamed appellant then too.

She testified to having called the

police on appellant once or twice when in fact she had called more
that six times.

It was not brought out that appellant was

acquitted of previous false charges brought by her.
Appellant contends Ms. Tyler fabricated evidence 10 days after
the fire (Nov 28 R p. 137-138;91-92)

An investigation of those

materials may have discredited Ms. Tyler.

By the time McCaughey

investigated, the evidence was gone.
There were fingerprints on the container that the state
theorized contained the accelerant used in the fire.

While they

weren't appellants fingerprints (Nov. 28 R. P. 124) no effort was
made to see if they were Ms. Tyler's or even if that particular
accelerant was used.
Appellant had no trace of accelerant's about him upon his
arrest, which seems unlikely if he poured liquids over various
parts of the house after having been hit with a baseball bat hard
enough that Ms. Tyler said she thought she had broken his ribs.
(Nov. 28 R P. 169)
Appellants did not see any police reports or other discovery
before his preliminary hearing.

No one investigated his facts.
10

Bergeson failed to "function" as effective counsel during a
most crucial phase and barely functioned at all as far as legal
assistance to appellant.

Brown was ill-prepared, "winged" the

preliminary hearing, and then withdrew.
and

his

investigation

was not

timely

McCaughey came too late,
and

fruitless.

This

cumulative lack of reasonable effective representation prejudiced
appellant.

Insufficient defense was offered at his trial, and he

did not have meaningful advice and assistance of counsel through
critical stages of the proceedings.
Appellant

contends he has shown that but

for counsel's

deficient performance, the results of the proceedings would have
been different.

This conviction is suspect.

In view of the

totality of circumstance appellant was denied reasonable effective
representation.

As the court said in Templin:

"If counsel does not adequately investigate the underlying
facts of a case . . . counself s performance cannot fall within the
wide range of reasonable professional assistance 805 p2d at 188. )
Therefore, because counsel did not timely nor adequately
investigate the underlying facts here, the first part of the
Strickland test is met. (See id).
The second part of the test, prejudice, is presumed due to the
showing of actual and constructive denial of counsel.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, appellant asks the Court to find he
was denied reasonable effective assistance of counsel.
11

Appellant

has identified acts and omissions of counsel that fell below an
objective

standard

of reasonableness. Appellant

has met the

Strickland test.
Appellant asks this court to reverse his conviction and remand
this case back to the district court for a new trial.

Dated this

/
/

dav of
of 7'-<
day
-^-^^U^SL^L^

1992.

Respectfully submitted,

MANNY GARCIA,
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that four (4) copies of the foregoing Brief
of Appellant were delivered to the Attorney General's Office, 236
State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this
February 1992.

^ < (&iLc+

13

-—

7

day of

APPENDIX A

TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
AMENDMENT VI. [Rights of the accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the
State and the district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of counsel for his defence.

APPENDIX B

NANCY BERGESON, #303
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
v.
JAMES DOUGLAS TYLER,

Case No. 901007323FS

Defendant.
NANCY BERGESON, Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, on
appointment of the above-entitled court, herewith enters an
Appearance of Counsel of record for the above-named defendant.
DATED this ^flK

day of July, 1990.

NANCY BE
Attorney/'at Law
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Office of the Salt
Lake County Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
this

day of July, 1990.

NANCY BERGESONf #303
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH,
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
FORMAL REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY
PURSUANT TO RULE 16 OF THE
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

V.

JAMES DOUGLAS TYLER,

Case No. 901007323FS
JUDGE MAURICE D. JONES

Defendant.
COMES NOW the defendant, JAMES DOUGLAS TYLER, through his
attorney, NANCY BERGESON, and requests the following material be
provided to him as discovery no later than three days prior to the
calendar call presently set for the 12th day of July, 1990.
To-wit:
1.

All police reports and investigations concerning the

above-entitled case;
2.

All recorded statements of the defendant and

co-defendant(s), if any;
3.

The criminal record of the defendant or felony

convictions of any witnesses to be called by the prosecution;
4.
defendant;

All evidence tending to negate the guilt of the

5.

All evidence tending to mitigate the guilt of the

defendant;
6.

All evidence tending to mitigate the degree of the

offense for reduced punishment;
7.

All physical evidence taken and all investigative

analysis done on any evidence in the above-entitled case.
As provided in Rule 16, Section 77-35-26(5)(b), the State
shall make all above disclosures as soon as practicable following
the filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead,
DATED this y/'L-.day of July, 1990.
Respectfully submitted,

NANCY BERGESON
~JT~
Attorney for Defendant

DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Office of the Salt
Lake County Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
this

day of July, 1990.

DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney
MARTIN VERHOEF Bar No. 3326
Deputy County Attorneys
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
RESPONSE TO REQUEST
FOR DISCOVERY

Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 90107323FS
JAMES DOUGLAS TYLER,
Honorable
Defendant.
Your

general

request

for

discovery

cannot

pursuant to State v. Kniaht 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987).
enclosed

copies

of

pertinent

documents

reflecting

be

honored

Please find

only

what

is

contained in the prosecution file.

Other documents may or may not

exist

files and you

in individual

police

agency

are directed to

contact these agencies for such information.
The Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney will strictly comply
with

the

mandates

of

Rule

16

of

the

Utah

Rules

of

Criminal

Procedure.
DATED this 16th day of July, 1?30.
DAVID E- YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney

v
MARTIN VERHOEF
Deputy County Attorney

MEMORANDUM

DATE:

July 27, 1990

TO:

Nancy Bergeson

FROM:

John Wennergren

RE:

James Tyler

I interviewed Mr. Tyler in the Salt Lake County Jail on
July 26, 1990. He is an extremely angry person who demonstrates
his hostility readily. He was extremely upset that his attorney
was on vacation while "he was sitting around in the jail."
Mr. Tyler engaged in coherent and logical conversations during
our interview and did not demonstrate any signs of a psychosis, a
bipolar disorder, or any other serious mental illness. I suspect
Mr. Tyler is an extremely inadequate individual who has learned
to control and influence people around him by the use of his
anger. I suspect he would be diagnosed as a personality
disorder, perhaps an antisocial personality disorder. He tends
to minimize his own involvement in the incident and takes a great
deal of delight in blaming basically everything thing that's
happened to him on his ex-wife. It is instructive to note that
he was divorced from the victim approximately 1 1/2 years after
their marriage. They were married in 1983. Despite this fact he
continues to live off and on with her even though he lists a long
series of incidents in which she has done him wrong. Mr. Tyler
provided me with the attached list of demands which consists of
information he feels we should be checking out in order to prove
his wife is lying. He seems to feel this information will
vindicate him.
Mr. Tyler basically seems to be a somewhat hystronic
individual who seems to have adapted to living a "crisis"
lifestyle.
JW:sh
p.s. This is the same client that Bob Steele had the altercation
with in his office where he attempted to throw a chair at him.
We conflicted his misdemeanor case out of the office to Joe
Fratto because Mr. Tyler was trying to file attempted homicide
charges against Bob. You will probably want to speak to Bob
about this and also see if John Hill wants us to conflict this
case out as well.
Sheri

NANCY BERGESON (#0303)
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East Fifth South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
532-5444
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH,
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS
COURT APPOINTED COUNSEL
AND NOTICE OF HEARING

v.
JAMES TYLER,

Case No. 901007323FS

Defendant.
F. JOHN HILL, Director of Salt Lake Legal Defender
Association, and NANCY BERGESON, attorney for defendant, hereby move
this Court for an Order allowing the Salt Lake Legal Defender
Association to withdraw as court appointed counsel in the above
entitled matter on the grounds that a conflict of interest presently
exists between this defendant and the Salt Lake Legal Defender
Association.

It is further requested that KENNETH BROWN and RANDALL

COX be appointed to represent the defendant in all future
proceedings.
DATED this "?_ day of AUGUST, 1990.

s.<2*~~

JOHN HILL, Director
'alt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.

Attorney for Defendant

TYLER, JAMES DOUGLAS
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